To Aid, or Not to Aid? The Case of Rwanda
Economic Development, Governance
2013 - 04 - 29
Omar S. McDoom
UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe
What should donors do when confronted with regimes that violate
important normative standards of state behavior and commit human
rights abuses, war crimes or other grave ethical transgressions?
During the cold war, instrumental use of aid to support strategic
foreign policy objectives provoked little controversy if it supported
allies whose behaviour affronted morally. Today, however, ethical
concerns whose roots lie in primarily Western conceptions of justice
and liberty find stronger expression in public opinion and civil
society. Indeed, human rights are likely to be part of the post-2015
development agenda. Taxpayer-funded support for illegitimate and
repressive regimes faces much stronger scrutiny now, especially in
times of austerity at home.
Post-genocide Rwanda represents one particularly high-profile and
difficult dilemma for Western donors. Rwanda is not an unequivocal
case of an egregious wrongdoer. Its critics point to the country's
poor performance in international measures of human rights compliance
and political freedoms, and the regime stands accused by the UN of
promoting war in eastern Congo. Yet the same regime enjoys the moral
distinction of ending the genocide whilst the world stood by —
inaction that now weighs heavily on the bystanders' consciences and
that constrains their criticisms. The regime has also made remarkable
achievements in respect of growth, public good provision and,
according to government data, also poverty and inequality reduction,
notwithstanding the enormous damage to its society and economy wrought
by the violence.
The dilemma has keenly tested the judgment of Rwanda's second-largest
donor, the UK. In the course of last year, The Department for
International Development (DFID) suspended, reinstated, and then
suspended again budgetary support for Rwanda. Its equivocation tells
of the complex choice that donors face in whether to aid or not to aid
regimes whose ethical records raise concerns at the international
level.
"The DFID suspended, reinstated, and then suspended again budgetary
support for Rwanda. Its equivocation tells of the complex choice that
donors face...."
The arguments are persuasive on both sides of the debate. Freezing
aid, in full or in part, is a method for signalling disapproval of
government behaviours that violate international obligations and other
important normative standards. Enforced consistently, it can help
build and sustain an international legal and moral order. Moreover, to
ignore offending behaviour can have very serious consequences.
Rwanda, for example, was itself a highly-favoured aid recipient on the
eve of its 1994 genocide, despite a series of credibly documented
ethnic massacres prior to this. The stakes, however, need not be so
high to justify donor response. Continued support of a regime that is
unresponsive to and repressive of its citizens undermines the
coherence of a development programme whose explicit objective is to
improve the welfare and alleviate the suffering of the poor.
Yet the counterarguments are also strong. Should wealthy donors
enforce standards of acceptable behaviour for poorer aid recipients?
The question is particularly relevant if consistent enforcement is
subject to political considerations and if donors are vulnerable to
claims of dual standards. Freezing aid may also, depending on the
nature of the aid, ultimately end up punishing the poor for the
actions of their leaders.
Moreover, the ruling elite in highly aid-dependent countries may
engage in radical measures to assure their survival if the regime's
stability is threatened. The effectiveness of cutting aid is also
questionable. It may take time for the effects to be felt, especially
if donors do not co-ordinate among themselves ,or if the regime can
turn to another source of financing. China's strict policy of
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states for example
makes it an attractive alternative to Western donors.
An assessment of Rwanda today yields a mixed record.
Positively, President Paul Kagame and his ruling Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) have set out an ambitious vision for Rwanda to become a
middle-income country by 2020, and they have made remarkable progress
since 1994. Growth has averaged over 6 percent per annum, the service
sector has overtaken agriculture in its contribution to GDP, regional
trade has gone up, and most recently poverty and inequality have gone
down according to the latest government data. The social sectors have
recorded progress too. Child and maternal mortality have dropped
significantly and free, universal primary education has been
established. On the governance front, donors commend Rwanda for the
improved effectiveness of its civil service and its achievements in
reducing low- and mid-level corruption. Rwanda also boasts the highest
number of female parliamentarians in the world.
Less positively, however, there has been a decline in political
freedom with authoritarian constraints imposed on independent media
and opposition political parties and with irregularities in the 2003
and 2010 elections. Social cohesion remains poor 18 years after the
genocide despite a prohibition on ethnic identification and an attempt
to forge a national identity; ethnic grievances persist, subterranean,
in both the exclusion of
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) crimes from the gacaca courts
established to deal with crimes committed during the genocide and in
the perceived pro-Tutsi allocation of state and para-statal jobs; and
the regime faces accusations of supporting rebel groups in eastern
Congo that have targeted civilians and destabilized the region.
Given Rwanda's record, what then should an influential donor such as
DFID do? There is no magic bullet for Rwanda, or indeed for other
countries whose records prompt this question. Instead I suggest five
guiding principles to help shape donors' thinking as they respond to
offending regimes:
Think longer term — beyond the current regime of the aid recipient and
beyond the current regime of their own country.
Adapt the immediate response and longer-term engagement strategy to
the distinguishing contextual characteristics of the country.
Agree — contractually and publicly — on the principles that will
govern the donor-recipient relationship
ex ante, with clear redlines and defined consequences for unacceptable
behaviours, and be consistent in their enforcement.
Where possible, consult and co-ordinate with other donors on both the
immediate response and the criteria for re- engagement.
Attempt to assess whether the overall direction of change within the
country has been towards improving or worsening the welfare of its
people.
What then is the outcome of applying these five principles to Rwanda?
First, while Rwanda's remarkable progress is attributable to the RPF
and its leadership under Paul Kagame, thinking long term means asking
whether this progress could be sustained without them. Donors then
should remember their relationship is with the country, and not with a
particular regime or individual.
"Donors should remember their relationship is with the country, and
not with a particular regime or individual."
While it is politically useful to be able to showcase aid successfully
at work today, it can easily be undone tomorrow. Twenty-one years of
donor support to President Habyarimana's regime were tragically
undermined with his assassination on 6 April 1994. Thinking long term
also means discounting personal friendships between political leaders
of donors and recipients (Tony Blair and Clare Short were both close
to Paul Kagame for example) and resisting the usually shorter-term
considerations of the donor's foreign policy establishment.
Second, contextually, Rwanda has a highly unusual ethnic demography
for sub-Saharan Africa. The country comprises only three ethnic
groups, and one group (the Hutu) numerically dominates the (Tutsi and
Twa) minorities. A competitive political system where power is
divided, as in a majoritarian system, rather than shared, as in a
consociational system, may be inappropriate, then, in the wake of
recent ethnic violence. To its credit, DFID does not promote democracy
in Rwanda. It aims instead to improve domestic accountability.
Third, DFID's Memorandum of Understanding, in which it set out its
partnership principles with the Government of Rwanda, is a very useful
model for how to structure a country relationship. It is a public
document setting out the agreement between the two countries on what
each party will do and what happens if the agreement is broken. The
agreement does, however, need to be consistently enforced.
Fourth, freezing aid would have been more effective if Rwanda's
largest donors had acted together. As it is, the UK cut budget
support, the US cut only military aid, and the World Bank is still
deciding what to do.
Fifth, while Rwanda's government appears to be relatively responsive
to the needs of its people, it invites speculation on its legitimacy
through its authoritarian controls on political freedom. It defends
these measures by claiming ethnically divisive elements persist in
Rwandan politics and society. The claim has some merit. Rwanda's
political opposition and media need to show they will use any greater
freedom given to them responsibly.
A donor's response then should consider the overall direction of
change. Is the government incrementally liberalizing politically? I
would suggest not. Are civil and political society incrementally
maturing? I would argue they have not been given the opportunity.
Taking all of this into account, in my view, DFID's decision to
suspend budgetary support then is warranted.
DFID, and other donors, however, have responded principally to
Rwanda's illegal and bellicose actions in eastern Congo. But should
they also respond to the declining political space within Rwanda?
I have argued elsewhere that the possibility of an
extra-constitutional regime change is increasing within Rwanda
.
It is not clear presently who could succeed the RPF or Paul Kagame.
The independent opposition remains heavily constrained, and dissenters
or rivals within the RPF have fled into exile. It is also unclear how
change would happen within the constitution. The RPF incumbents,
silently perceived as a Tutsi party, exercise strict control over the
electoral process. They fear free and fair elections would empower the
Hutu majority and lead to the persecution of Rwanda's Tutsi minority
once more.
At present, the greatest risk of regime change is a coup from within
the ruling party. The power vacuum and ensuing power struggle this
would create would likely be accompanied by violence (though mass
violence is unlikely). Seen through this lens, the remarkable
achievements since the genocide for which donors commend Rwanda's
present government seem very fragile.
President Kagame and the RPF have accomplished much for Rwanda, but
they cannot be expected to rule forever. Indeed, Rwanda's constitution
mandates President Kagame to step down in August 2017 at the end of
his second term.
Given the risk of extra-constitutional regime change, it is in the
government's strategic self-interest to gradually transition the
country to a point where power can be transferred lawfully and
peacefully, and where civil and political society can act as a
responsible counterweight to a legitimate and responsive government.
Donors should keep this endpoint in mind as they ponder whether to
continue or to suspend aid.
♦ ♦ ♦
This article previously appeared in the January WIDER Angle
newsletter.under the title "To Aid or Not to Aid? The Case of Rwanda,
DFID, and the Good Aid Debate
http://www.google.ca/gwt/x?gl=CA&hl=en-CA&u=http://unu.edu/publications/articles/to-aid-or-not-to-aid-the-case-of-rwanda.html&q=should+repressive+rwanda+regime+receive+foreign+aid%3F&sa=X&ei=z0zoUr78AqSd0QWbqYH4Ag&ved=0CDEQFjAC
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